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We propose a single chunk model of long-term memory that combines the basic features of the
ACT-R theory and the multiple trace memory architecture. The pivot point of the developed theory
is a mathematical description of the creation of new memory traces caused by learning a certain
fragment of information pattern and affected by the fragments of this pattern already retained by the
current moment of time. Using the available psychological and physiological data these constructions
are justified. The final equation governing the learning and forgetting processes is constructed
in the form of the differential equation with the Caputo type fractional time derivative. Several
characteristic situations of the learning (continuous and discontinuous) and forgetting processes are
studied numerically. In particular, it is demonstrated that, first, the “learning” and “forgetting”
exponents of the corresponding power laws of the memory fractional dynamics should be regarded as
independent system parameters. Second, as far as the spacing effects are concerned, the longer the
discontinuous learning process, the longer the time interval within which a subject remembers the
information without its considerable lost. Besides, the latter relationship is a linear proportionality.
Keywords: human memory; memory trace; chunk; forgetting; learning; practice; spacing effects;
power law; fractional differential equations.
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL
BACKGROUND
There are a number of approaches to understand-
ing and describing processes in human mind. They
belong to different levels of abstraction, ranging from
neural and biochemical processes in the brain up to
philosophical constructions, and study its different as-
pects. In the present work we focus our attention on the
phenomenological (psychological) description of human
memory dealing with it as a whole, i.e., without reducing
the corresponding mental functions to the real physiolog-
ical processes implementing them. A review of advances
made in this scope during the last decades can be found
in a monograph by Anderson [1] who inspired the de-
velopment of the ACT-R concept in cognitive science, a
modern theory about how human cognition works.
The ACT-R theory operates with three types of human
memory, sensory, short-term, and long-term ones [2] and
accepts, in particular, the following basic postulates.
First, the declarative (long-term) memory is organized
in chunks [3], certain cognitive units related to some in-
formation objects. At the first approximation the learn-
ing, memorizing, and retrieval of a given object pro-
ceeds via the creation and evolution of the corresponding
chunk. Naturally, chunks can interact with one another,
in particular, forming larger composed chunks and, fi-
nally, their hierarchical network. The notion of chunk
is general, therefore, it is rather problematic to define
it more precisely, for discussion and history see, e.g., a
review by Anderson and Lebiere [4].
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Second, each chunk individually is characterized by its
strength F which determines also the information reten-
tion, namely, the probability of successful retrieval of
the corresponding information from a given chunk [5, 6].
Since the classical experiments of Ebbinghaus [7] a rather
big data-set about the retention ability of human mem-
ory has been accumulated for time scales from several
minutes up to a few weeks. It has been figured out that
the memory strength F decays with time t according to
the power-law [6, 8–11], i.e., exhibits the asymptotic be-
havior
F (t) ∝ 1
td
, (1)
where the exponent d is a certain constant. It should be
noted that, in general, this dependence meets the second
Jost’s law, the increment of the strength decay becomes
weaker as time goes on (see, e.g., a review by Wixted
[12]). Appealing at least to the data-set collected by
Ebbinghaus [7] and analyzed by Anderson and Schooler
[6] as well as one collected and studied by Wixted and
Ebbesen [10, 11] the exponent d seems to be rather uni-
versal and can be estimated as d ∼ 0.1− 0.2.
The third postulate concerns the multiple-trace ar-
rangement of human memory. It assumes that each at-
tempt of learning and memorizing some information frag-
ment produces a separate trace m in human memory. So
the corresponding cognitive unit, a chunk, is actually a
collection {mi} of many memory traces and its strength
F is the sum of their individual activation levels {fi} [13]
F (t) =
∑
mi∈Chunk
fi(t) . (2)
Evidence collected currently in physiology (see, e.g., work
by Yassa and Reagh [14] and references therein) partly
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2supports this concept. Its implementation in physiologi-
cal terms is reduced to the Multiple Trace Theory (MTT)
developed by Nadel and Moscovitch [15] appealing to the
role of the hippocampus in the encoding of new memory
traces as well as the retrieval of all the previous traces, in-
cluding remote ones. The preceding alternative of MTT
is the Standard Model of Systems Consolidation (SMSC:
Squire and Alvarez [16]). It assumes the hippocampus
to “teach” the cortex a memory trace strengthening the
connectivity between its individual elements over time
and, finally, consolidating the memory.
Recently Yassa and Reagh [14] have proposed a Com-
petitive Trace Theory (CTT) combining elements SMSC
and MTT. It suggests that when a memory is reactivated
by a new cue, the hippocampus acts to re-instantiate the
original memory traces, recombine their elements in the
episodic memory, and add or subtract individual contex-
tual features. As a result, a new memory trace overlap-
ping with the original ones is created and ready to be
stored in the neocortex. However, in contrast to MTT,
CTT supposes that the memory traces are not stored
in parallel but compete for representation in the neocor-
tex. Two relative phenomena occur here: consolidation
and decontextualization. First, overlapping features in
the memories should not compete for representation and
thus are strengthened, i.e., consolidated. Second, non-
overlapping features should compete with one another
resulting in mutual inhibition and, as a result, memo-
ries become decontextualized. Nadel and Moscovitch [17]
proposed the reactivation of memory traces to strengthen
also the links between the traces too. The concept of such
a multi-trace consolidation can be regarded as the fourth
postulate of the ACT-R theory.
As the fifth postulate we note the following. The hip-
pocampus is involved in the “reconstruction” rather than
the “retrieval” of the memory. So, as CTT states, new
memory traces are only partially but not completely over-
lap with the original traces. It is due to the hippocam-
pus capability of supporting rapid encoding of unique ex-
periences by orthogonalizing incoming inputs such that
their interference is minimized, which is termed pattern
separation; the available evidence for this feature was
recently discussed by Yassa and Stark [18]. This pat-
tern separation together with the corresponding pattern
completion via creating new memory traces endows our
episodic memory system with richness, associativity, and
flexibility [18].
Finally, the ACT-R theory accepts an important gen-
eralization about expansion (2). It assumes that the indi-
vidual activation levels fi(t) of memory traces decreases
with time t also according to the power law and, after
formation, their individual dynamics is mutually inde-
pendent. Thereby the strength F (t) of the corresponding
chunk is the superposition [5, 6]
F (t) =
∑
mi∈Chunk
Ci
(t− ti)d , (3)
where {Ci} are some constants and ti is the time moment
time
moment of transferring 
a new pattern fragment 
from the working memory 
to the declarative memory 
time
FIG. 1. Illustration of the used model for the chunk evo-
lution as new slides are created in order to compensate the
degradation of the previous ones.
when the chunk mi was created. It should be noted that
expression (3) does not take into account the chunk in-
teraction.
Our following constructions will be based on these pos-
tulates. In the present work we will confine our consid-
eration to the dynamics of a single chunk and ignore the
effects of memory consolidation which are likely to be
crucial only on relatively large time scales. Mathemati-
cal description of the chunk interaction and the memory
consolidation are challenging problems on their own and
require individual investigation.
II. SINGLE CHUNK MODEL
A chunk M is considered to be a collection of traces
{m(t′)} created in the working memory at time moments
{t′} and stored in the declarative (long-term) memory.
These traces will be also called slides for reasons apparent
below. Let us assume that the chunk M as a whole
contains a certain fragment of information, a pattern P,
so all its slides retain different fragments of this pattern.
The time evolution of the chunk M as a whole unit is
described in terms of its strength F (t), the measure of the
relative volume of the pattern pieces that are retrievable
3at the current moment of time t [1, 5]. The individual
evolution of the slides {m(t′)} is characterized by similar
quantities {f(t, t′)} depending on the current time t and
the time t′ when the corresponding slide was created and
stored.
A. Slide Formation Mechanism
The chunk slides are assumed to be created according
to the following scenario illustrated in Fig. 1. Memory
continuously looses some fragments of the pattern P. So
when at the current moment of time t the chunkM as a
whole is retrieved from the declarative memory only some
its fragment Pt can be retrieved, which is characterized by
the value F (t) < 1. Then addition practice or learning is
necessary to reconstruct the initial pattern P. Therefore
a new slide m(t) to be created during this action has to
contain, at least, the fragment P \ Pt. In principle, the
pattern fragment ∆tP to be stored in m(t) can include
other fragments of the initial pattern P. So in a more
general case the condition ∆tP∩Pt 6= ∅ may hold, which
is worthy of individual investigation. In the present work
we confine our consideration to the limit case where
∆tP = P \ Pt , (4a)
if the current learning action is enough to create the frag-
ment m(t) containing ∆tP. However, there could be a sit-
uation when the time interval τ of the learning process
before the slide m(t) to be transfered to the declarative
memory is not enough to do this. Under such conditions
we assume that before transferring the slide m(t) to the
declarative memory it is cut off, i.e., its capacity for new
information is reduced and the saved pattern fragment
meets the condition
∆tP ⊂ P \ Pt . (4b)
In both the cases it is reasonable to measure the capacity
C(t) of the new slide based on the current strength F (t)
of the chunk M. Namely, in case (4a) we set
C(t) = 1− F (t) (5a)
and in case (4b) the slide capacity is calculated appealing
to the notion of attention W paid to learning the pattern
piece P \ Pt during the time interval τ . The following
ansatz
C(t) = [1− F (t)]
{
1− exp
[
− Wτ
T (F )
]}
(5b)
is used, where T (F ) is the time scale characterizing the
process of learning the pattern ∆tP and given by the
expression
T (F ) = (+ F )−α(1− F )1−βτm . (6)
Here the scale τm characterizes the time interval required
for the working memory to create one slide and the de-
pendence of the quantity T (F ) on F reflects the fact that
the higher the current value F (t), the less the time neces-
sary to learn the pattern ∆tP completely, the exponents
α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) specify this dependence. The pa-
rameter  characterizes the duration of initial creation
of the pattern P in the working memory. If we retrieve
the chunkM immediately after this action its achievable
pattern is
Pt+τ = Pt ∪∆tP . (7)
The strength f(t, t) of the slide m(t) created and saved
just now is set equal to unity,
f(t, t′)|t=t′ = 1 , (8)
which is related directly to the assumption about the
reduction of the slide capacity at the moment of its cre-
ation. As time goes on, the strength of all the slides de-
creases and without addition learning the strength F (t)
of the chunkM as whole is written as the sum of all the
slides created previously
F (t) =
∑
t′<t
C(t′)f(t, t′) . (9)
Equalities (4), (5), and (9) may be treated as the
Bayesian approximation of the memorizing process.
B. Individual Slide Dynamics
The given model assumes the slides created previously
not to be affected by learning at the current moment of
time. In other words, after creation their evolution is
governed only by some internal mechanisms. Keeping in
mind the results to be obtained let us write the equation
governing the evolution of a slides m(t′) in the form
∂f
∂t
= −a
τ
f b (10)
where a > 0 and b > 1 are some parameters. Equality (8)
is actually the initial condition imposed on the function
f(t, t′). Its solution is
f(t, t′) =
[
1 +
(t− t′)
τ0
]−d
for t ≥ t′ , (11)
where we have introduced the new parameters d = 1/(b−
1) and τ0 = τd/a. The substitution of (11) into (9) yields
F (t) =
∑
t′<t
C(t′)
[
1 +
(t− t′)
τ0
]−d
. (12)
It should be noted that this governing equation of the
individual trace dynamics is fair similar to the mathe-
matical model for a single trace memory proposed by
Wickelgren [9].
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FIG. 2. The accepted ansatz for the dependence of the learn-
ing rate L(F,W ) (in dimensionless units) on the strength F
of a given chunk. The used approximation for the attention
quantity W (F ) depending on the chunk strength is shown in
inset. The values of  = 0.01, α = 0.5, β = 0.1, and Fc = 0.95
were used in constructing the present curve.
C. Continuous Approximation
Expression (5b) can be regarded as a solution C(ζ)|ζ=τ
of the equation
dC
dζ
= (1− F − C)W
T
(13)
subject to the initial condition
C|ζ=0 = 0 , (14)
where the values F and T are treated as constants, the
variable W describing the attention to the subject of cur-
rent learning is assumed to be a smooth function on time
scales about τ . It enables us to represent the value of
C(t), Exp. (5b), as the cumulative result of infinitesimal
increments
C(t) =
∫
dC , (15)
of a certain continuous process, where
dC = (1− F )W
T
dt and F (t+ dt) = F (t) + dC .
This expression would lead exactly to formula (5b) if
the time scale T were independent of F . However,
ansatz (5b) has been chosen rather arbitrary keeping in
mind only the basic features it should possess. So we
are free to replace it by the expression stemming from
model (15). The last equality in model (15) formally co-
incides with formula (9) except for the fact that the value
F (t) has to decrease additionally due to time evolution of
temporal elements created previously. However, all the
“microscopic” time scales, in particular, τ0 and τm, are
related directly to the interval within that a new slide
is created in the working memory and, then, transfered
to the declarative memory. It enables us to ignore this
decrease in the value F (t) during the time interval τ . As
a result expression (12) can be reduced to the following
integral
F (t) =
t∫
−∞
[1−F (t′)] W (t
′)
T [F (t′)]
[
1 +
(t− t′)
τ0
]−d
dt′ . (16)
Moreover, due to the integral∫ t
0
1
ζd
dζ
converging at the lower boundary ζ = 0 for the exponent
d < 1 we can replace kernel (12) by the corresponding
power-law kernel[
1 +
(t− t′)
τ0
]−d
⇒ τ
d
0
(t− t′)d . (17)
After this replacement expression (16) reads
F (t) =
t∫
−∞
[1− F (t′)] W (t
′)
T [F (t′)]
τd0
(t− t′)d dt
′ . (18a)
or using ansatz (6)
F (t) =
1
τ1−dm
t∫
−∞
[+F (t′)]α[1−F (t′)]βW (t′) 1
(t− t′)d dt
′ .
(18b)
In deriving expression (18b) we have aggregated the ra-
tio (τ0/τm)
d into the quantity W . So, first, the integral
equation (18a) contains only one microscopic time scale
τm regarded as a certain model parameter. Second, the
dimensionless quantity W (t) describes the attention to
the subject during the learning process. If W = 1 then
the given pattern P can be learned completely for a time
interval about τ .
Finalizing the given construction we will assume that
the learning process was initiated at time t = 0 and be-
fore it no information about the pattern P was available,
i.e., for t < 0 the value F (t) = 0. In this case the integral
equation (18b) can be rewritten in the form of the follow-
ing differential equation with time fractional derivative of
the Caputo type
τ (1−d)m · CD(1−d)F = (+ F )g(1− F )γW (t) . (19)
It is the desired governing equation for learning and for-
getting processes.
In order to avoid some artifacts in numerical simula-
tion we will accept an additional assumption that it is
not possible to get strictly the limit value of the chunk
strength F = 1 by learning a subject. Indeed, the closer
5the chunk strength to unity, the more attention is neces-
sary for a human to recognized which piece of information
is unknown for him. As a result, we introduce a certain
critical value Fc ' 1 such that, when the chunk strength
F exceeds it, F > Fc, a human considers the success of
learning to be achieved and it attention to the learned
subjects disappears, i.e., W (F ) = 0 for F > Fc. It is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The characteristic features of the system dynamics
were studied numerically using the explicit 2-FLMM al-
gorithm of second order [19] for solving equation (19).
Figure 3 presents some of the obtained results.
A. I. Fractional Dynamics of Forgetting
Plot I (Fig. 3) shows the forgetting dynamics under the
“basic” conditions matching the following hypothetical
situation. At the initial moment of time t = 0, a subject
starts to learn continuously an unknown for him informa-
tion pattern being retained in a single chunk and at time
t = TL ends this process when the chunk strength gets its
limit value Fc ' 1. As time goes on, the chunk strength
F (t) decreases, which specifies the decay of retrievable
information. As should be expected, the asymptotics of
F (t) is of the power law and looks like a straight line on
the log-log scale plot. Naturally, in a certain neighbor-
hood QL of the time moment t = TL this asymptotics
does not hold. However, for small values of the exponent
d (for d = 0.2 in Plot I) this neighborhood is narrow and
becomes actually invisible in approximating experimen-
tal data even with weak scattering.
B. II. Fractional Dynamics of Continuous Learning
Plot II exhibits the learning dynamics under the same
“basic” conditions. The growth of the chunk strength
F (t) is visualized again in the log-log scale for various
values of the parameters determining how the learning
rate L(F,W ) changes during the process (they are given
in the inset). As seen, the function F (t) strictly is not
of the power law. However, if it is reconstructed from
some set of scattered experimental points as the best ap-
proximation within a certain class of functions, a power
law fit (linear ansatz in the log-log scale) may be ac-
cepted as a relevant model. It allows us to introduce an
effective exponent dL of the approximation F (t) ∝ tdL .
Appealing again to Plot II, we draw a conclusion that
this effective exponent depends not only on the “forget-
ting” exponent d but also on the other system parame-
ters. Thereby, in trying to determine the set of quantities
required for characterizing human long-term memory, the
“forgetting” and “learning” exponents, d and dL, may be
regarded as independent parameters.
C. III. Spacing effects
Plots IIIa and IIIb illustrate the found results in the
case mimicking the discontinuous learning process. It
again assumes a subject to start learning an initially un-
known information pattern being retained in one chunk
during the process, however, now he does not do this con-
tinuously. Instead, the learning proceeds via a sequence
of trials of a fixed duration that are separated by some
time gap (spacing) until the subject gets the success at a
certain time moment TL. Naturally, the longer the spac-
ing, the longer the total time TL as well as the larger the
number NL of trials required for this. So, in order to
compare their characteristic properties let us renormal-
ize the time scale in such a way that the learning process
end at t = 1 in dimensionless units, in other words, the
time is measured in units of TL. In this case, as seen in
Plot IIIa and IIIb, the main characteristics of the shown
processes become rather similar with respect to the dy-
namics of learning and forgetting. This result poses a
question about optimizing a learning process by divid-
ing it into rather short trials separated by relatively long
time intervals. This effect is also called the distributed
practice, an analysis of available experimental data can
found, e.g., in review by Cepeda et al. [20] and Cepeda
et al. [21] as well. At least, within the framework of the
present fair simple model an increase of the time spacing
gives rise, on one hand, to the growth of the learning du-
ration but, on the other hand, enables one to remember
this information for a longer time without its consider-
able lost.
D. General Comments
As far as the theoretical aspects of the present re-
search are concerned, we note appealing to the obtained
results that the multiple trace concept of memory archi-
tecture requires an individual mathematical formalism
irreducible to the classical notions created in physics. In
particular, even at the “microscopic” level dealing with
slides (traces) the system dynamics is not reduced to the
motion in a certain phase space but continuous genera-
tion of such phase spaces. Their interactions with one
another become a key point of the corresponding theory.
Besides, the governing equation (19) admits the fol-
lowing interpretation. Its left-hand side describes “in-
ternal” evolution of human memory on its own, whereas
the right-hand side plays the role of “sources” generating
new elements of memory. This approach can enhance the
development of human memory theory by separating the
phenomena to be addressed into different categories.
6FIG. 3. Some results of numerical simulation. First, it is the dynamics of forgetting (I) and learning (II) under the “basic”
conditions when a subject learns an unknown information continuously until he gets the local (temporal) success in time TL.
Second, it is the spacing effects in discontinuous learning (IIIa) and the following forgetting (IIIb). In this case the subject
learns an unknown information via a sequence of trials of a fixed duration until he gets the final success at a certain moment of
time TL. Naturally, the longer the time spacing between two successive trials, the larger the number NL of trials and the longer
the total time interval TL are necessary for this. In simulations the following parameters  = 0.01, α = 0.5, β = 0.1, Fc = 0.95,
dt = 0.001, and TL|d=0.2 = 1.70, TL|d=0.5 = 1.52 were used as a common setup, the other individual values are shown in the
corresponding plots.
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